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ABSTRACT 
TAYLER KENT: The Problem of Privilege: Temperament and Diversity in Kant’s 
“Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen”  
 
(Under the direction of Dr. Jonathan Hess) 
 
 This thesis explores Kant’s theory of the temperaments as outlined in his 1764 pre-
critical essay on the aesthetic categories of the beautiful and the sublime. While this text is 
often singled out for its prejudicial remarks, the chapter on temperament provides a useful 
framework for understanding Kant’s thinking on diversity at this stage in his philosophy, and 
is critical for any attempt to reconcile the tensions in this work between its advocacy of 
cosmopolitan universalism and its troubling observations on gender and race. The first 
chapter explores Kant’s awareness of the problem of privileging the melancholic above all 
others as the only temperament capable of achieving true moral virtue. The second and third 
chapters investigate how Kant engages in a struggle to redefine what constitutes the morally 
feeling subject in order to exclude women and non-Europeans from his ideal community of 
rational and moral human subjects.  
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     Introduction 
 
 In a scathing 1799 review of Immanuel Kant’s Anthropologie in pragmatischer 
Hinsicht, Friedrich Schleiermacher referred to Kant’s study of the heterogeneity of the 
human race as “eine Sammlung von Trivialitäten” and “eine Negation aller Anthropologie” 
(Schleiermacher 300). Objecting, among other things, to Kant’s treatment of women as an 
abnormality, as well as remarking on the impossibility of creating an anthropology that was 
both practical and popular, Schleiermacher touched on points of critique that would also 
continue to be leveled at Kant’s anthropological writings, with ever-increasing intensity, 
straight into the twenty-first century.  Had Schleiermacher directed his review at one of 
Kant’s earlier works, his 1764 Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen, 
upon which much of Kant’s later anthropological writings are based, his criticism would 
likely have been just as harsh.  This pre-critical treatise on the diversity of humanity and its 
capacity for moral feeling was Kant’s premier attempt at a “popular philosophy” and is 
widely regarded by Kant scholars as somewhat of an embarrassment for its troubling remarks 
on gender and race.  
 In the Beobachtungen, Kant outlines his aesthetic and moral philosophy of the 
relationship between the beautiful and the sublime and how the attributes of both categories 
can be applied to traits of human nature, gender, and national character.  In this text, Kant 
presents himself not as a critical philosopher, but rather as an eloquent essayist, expressing 
his observations through an accessible and clear writing style that is not typical of his later 
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critical works. Kant’s aim here is to make a contribution to a new analysis of human feeling 
in which a focus on the empirical method of observation (Beobachtungen) is of central 
importance. In fact, the term Beobachten was the crucial term for anthropology in the mid-
eighteenth century in Germany, and is the very foundation upon which much of Kant’s 
notion of a disciplinary anthropology was based (Zammito 108). Through its style and 
subject matter this work can be seen as both an attempt to morally educate a relatively broad 
reading public and to contribute to the formal intellectual development of the discipline of 
anthropology during the Enlightenment.  Based on the assertion that feeling is what reveals 
the true nature of the subject, Kant proposes that the “finer feelings” which are responsible 
for man’s moral virtue are divided into two distinct categories, the beautiful and the sublime. 
These two categories are then in subsequent chapters mapped out onto the human 
temperaments, genders, and national characters. In the first of the four sections of the essay, 
entitled “Von den unterschiedenen Gegenständen des Gefühls vom Erhabenen und Schönen,” 
Kant delineates his conceptions of what types of finer feeling constitute the sublime, and 
which belong to the beautiful, making clear one of his primary distinctions, that the sublime 
moves (rührt) and the beautiful charms (reizt), privileging the sublime as the category most 
closely associated with true moral virtue based on principles. Using this distinction as the 
basis of his argument, Kant proceeds in the following three sections of the treatise to explore 
how the finer feelings of the sublime and beautiful manifest themselves in greater or lesser 
quantities in human temperaments, genders, and national characters. In the section on 
temperament, entitled “Von den Eigenschaften des Erhabenen und Schönen am Menschen 
überhaupt,” Kant explores the Hippocratic tradition of the four temperaments, the 
melancholic, the sanguine, the choleric and the phlegmatic, mapping his theory of the 
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beautiful and sublime onto these categories. Kant emphasizes in this section that the genuine 
virtue based on principles that he associated with the sublime in the previous section is most 
closely linked to the melancholy temperament. It is in the third and fourth sections of this 
essay, entitled “Von dem Unterschiede des Erhabenen und Schönen in dem Gegenverhältniβ 
beider Geschlechter” and “Von den Nationalcharaktern, in so ferne sie auf dem 
unterschiedlichen Gefühl des Erhabenen und Schönen beruhen,” however, where Kant’s 
remarks get him into the most trouble. In these two sections, Kant makes it quite clear which 
genders and nationalities are “beautiful” as opposed to the more privileged “sublime,” and 
consequently these sections have been heavily criticized for their overt racism and misogyny.  
 Critics have not only rightly pointed out the text’s racially demeaning and overtly 
sexist elements, but they have also suggested that in comparison to Kant’s critical work, this 
essay seems deficient and rather humiliating. In his study of the characterization of the 
sublime, Ian Balfour states, “[by] comparison with the Critique of Judgment (1790), a 
transcendental inquiry into the conditions of the possibility of aesthetic judgment, the text of 
the Observations is in many ways meager and inadequate, at times downright embarrassing” 
(325). Others have argued that the text makes for “difficult reading,” not because the 
language is particularly complex, but because the chapters of the work on gender and 
national character are so saturated with glaring prejudice (Balfour 326; Shell 455).   
 But while some have been quick to dismiss this work for its blatant stereotypes, 
several other contemporary scholars have argued that despite the Beobachtungen’s myopic 
reflections on women and non-Europeans, a closer analysis of this text reveals a fascinating 
picture of Kant’s world view at this stage of his philosophy, a stage marked by an 
experimentation with new forms and an uncharacteristically graceful and witty writing style, 
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a genuine attempt to reach a broader audience, and an intense engagement with the writings 
of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. The intricacies of this text are often overlooked due to a tendency 
to judge this text based on modern conceptions of race, the impracticality of which has been 
pointed out by post-colonial philosopher Emmanuel Eze.  He claims that there was no 
“empirical context to the concept of ‘race’ in the eighteenth century” (166), and that if there 
was such a concept, it was Kant who laid much of the groundwork for it (166). Eze further 
points out that Kant’s mapping of the humors onto racial differences in his lectures on 
physical geography, although quite legitimately “racist” by today’s standards, should still be 
taken seriously as a significant early attempt to understand the concept of race. He says: 
 It would be unwise to dismiss these antecedents because they are still the ‘racial’ 
 territories or their non-existence, upon which, today the genetic sciences seek to shed 
 some light. Archaic as some of the ancient and classical categories may sound, it is 
 indeed the Hippocratic- Galenic and Linnaean taxonomy that residually informs 
 today’s most influential biological thinking in the areas of racial science (166).  
  
 Scholars have argued that rather than merely dismissing this essay for its disturbing 
observations on race and gender, it is perhaps productive to take a closer look at the chapter 
on human temperament, as it is the most critical for understanding the work as a whole. 
Susan Shell has pointed out how Kant seems to concede a degree of ambiguity or at least 
“acknowledge his own limitations as a spectator” in this chapter (Shell 458). Others have 
extended this argument and contended that this concession of a degree of ambiguity in this 
section of the treatise is one of the most useful for attempting to reconcile its tensions. Mark 
Larrimore states in his study of temperament in the Beobachtungen that the system that Kant 
proposes by which people of all temperaments work together to form a moral whole is a 
“temperament argument writ large, whereby society as a whole is best off with a variety of 
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types, whose strengths and weaknesses provoke each other and keep each other in check” 
(Larrimore 273).   
 While these arguments have built a relatively solid framework for emphasizing the 
importance of this rather obscure pre-critical text, there is still more work that needs to be 
done.  Some critics flat-out dismiss this essay as an embarrassing racist and misogynist rant. 
Others do acknowledge the significance of the essay’s unique reflections on temperament. 
But for the most part these analyses are concerned primarily with mapping the progression of 
this theory over the entire course of Kant’s thinking on the subject of the humors, particularly 
by comparing the Beobachtungen with his later work Anthropologie aus pragmatischer 
Hinsicht. These types of analyses often completely ignore the text’s less salient moments. 
Surprisingly, very little critical work has been done that analyzes this essay as a whole. I 
propose that it is fruitful to examine this entire text, including its problematic elements, and 
ask the question: Is it possible to use Kant’s theory of the humors in his Beobachtungen to 
better understand its disquieting remarks about women and race?     
 This paper will expand upon the existing scholarship on Kant’s observations on 
human temperament in the Beobachtungen, but will also attempt to shed new light on the text 
as a whole. I will argue that while all four sections of this essay are structurally quite similar, 
it is in the chapter on human temperament where Kant’s “feeling for the beauty and dignity 
of human nature” is most apparent, a feeling that clearly embraces and necessitates diversity 
as a key component of his ideal picture of humanity.  While the sections on gender and 
national character use similar structures and methods of categorizations, syntheses, and 
exclusions, the second chapter of the essay, in which these categories are explicitly mapped 
out onto the four human temperaments, most clearly reflects an embracing of humanity in all 
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its differences. I will further argue that it is in his exploration of human temperament where 
Kant struggles the most with the inherent problems of privileging the “sublime” melancholic 
temperament over the “beautiful” sanguine and choleric temperaments, revealing himself to 
be conflicted about the relationship between these two aesthetic and moral categories.  I will 
argue that this consciousness of the problems with his own empirical method in this 
particular section of the work provides a useful and often overlooked framework for 
understanding Kant’s ideas on diversity at this particular stage of his philosophy. I will argue 
that Kant’s acknowledgment of the inherent problems with privileging one human 
temperament over the other is significant because it represents an embrace of human variety 
and difference that is not present at other junctures in the essay. Kant’s admittance of the 
problem of privileging the melancholic temperament reveals him as deeply conflicted about 
the inherent contradictions of privileging some individuals over others, and is a struggle that 
is unique to this particular chapter. This recognition of the necessity of difference with regard 
to character is critical for any attempts to reconcile the tensions in this work between its 
advocacy of cosmopolitan universalism and its troubling and prejudicial observations on 
gender and race. 
 In addition to engaging with Kant’s theory of temperaments in the Beobachtungen, I 
shall further my analysis by examining the subsequent chapters on both gender and national 
character, exploring how the “feeling for the beauty and dignity of human nature” which 
Kant advocates in his discussion of the temperaments is almost entirely absent from these 
subsequent sections.  In these chapters I will show how Kant is engaged in a critical 
reworking of his own definition of what constitutes true moral virtue in order to justify the 
contradictions that arise from his observations about women and non-Europeans. While the 
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blatant racial and misogynistic statements in these sections of the work can by no means be 
defended or disregarded, it is my contention that this text should be regarded not primarily as 
a racist doctrine that excludes more than it embraces, but as both reflective of and a critical 
attempt to resolve a central and impossible problem of the Enlightenment: how to elevate a 
diverse and multifaceted humanity into a complete, beautiful, dignified, and all-
encompassing moral whole. In his chapter on gender, which largely restricts its comments to 
the necessary role of women, Kant engages in an analysis that is similar to his discussion of 
temperament in its description of the two sexes as distinct yet complementary, and in its 
insistence that nature seldom unites all noble and beautiful qualities in one human being. In 
his discussion of national character, Kant employs a similar strategy of highlighting the 
distinctive qualities between separate races and nations, privileging some and flat-out 
dismissing others, and yet ends his discussion with a call for all young citizens of the world 
to collectively act upon the moral feeling that lies“in dem Busen eines jeden jungen 
Weltbürgers.” Although these two sections on gender and national character reflect an often 
contradictory and narrow-minded view of humanity from an eighteenth-century Western 
European white male perspective, there are moments within the entire text that reveal Kant as 
a thinker who remains deeply conflicted about his own troubling observations. I will argue 
that Kant’s primary objective in the final two chapters of the Beobachtungen is to redefine 
what constitutes the morally feeling subject in order to exclude women and non-Europeans 
from his proposed ideal enlightened community. I contend that this repeated need to re-
justify his own categorizations in these final sections of the essay reveals Kant as a 
philosopher who is engaged in a deep struggle with the inherent tensions between the 
privileging of certain sexes and races over others and his earlier insist
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is universal. This text makes it clear that when Kant thinks of universality, he has in mind a 
system of categorizations that necessitate the privileging of the white male European over all 
other races and genders.   
 My analysis will begin with a reading of the section of the essay on human 
temperament. I will reflect here on how Kant’s mapping of the four humors (the melancholic, 
sanguine, choleric, and phlegmatic) comes from a Hippocratic tradition whose popularity 
ebbed and flowed since the middle ages, but which during the Enlightenment was 
reincarnated as a useful schema for aesthetic and anthropological reflections on human 
variety and difference.  I will further argue that it is precisely this section of the treatise that 
most clearly reveals Kant as an observer attempting to come to terms with human difference, 
pointing to moments within the text that make this struggle remarkably clear. As I move 
forward with my analysis of Kant’s reflections on gender, I will use my argument from the 
chapter on temperament as a framework for understanding Kant’s conception of men and 
women as “distinct yet complementary,” reflecting on Kant’s observations on the union 
between man and woman as the ideal expression of the beautiful and sublime. Through my 
reading I will show how this section of the treatise also reveals Kant as deeply conflicted 
about the role of women and their potential inclusion (or exclusion) from an ideal universal 
community composed of morally virtuous individuals.  I will similarly frame my argument as 
I proceed to a reading of the section of the treatise on national character. In this chapter I will 
focus briefly on the significance of this discussion to the developing fields of anthropology 
and physical geography in the eighteenth century. I will then illustrate how this chapter is 
predominantly concerned with redefining what constitutes moral personhood in order to 
justify the exclusion of certain nationalities from Kant’s portrait of the ideal humanity. While 
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Kant’s chapter on human temperament reveals him to be conflicted about the privileging of 
some natural dispositions over others, his observations on gender and national character 
exhibit a different kind of struggle. These sections are far less apologetic in their attempt to 
create a clear hierarchy which firmly establishes the white male as the superior prototype of 
Enlightenment ideals.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Privileging the Melancholic: Kant’s Theory of the Temperaments in “Von den 
Eigenschaften des Erhabenen und Schönen am Menschen überhaupt” 
  
 When we consider the work of Kant, we often think of his critical philosophy, most 
notably his three famous critiques, the Critique of Pure Reason, the Critique of Practical 
Reason, and the Critique of Judgment. These are works were not aimed at a broad reading 
public and were primarily designed for an academic and highly intellectual audience. It is 
difficult to conceive of the most famous critical philosopher of the Enlightenment as having 
ever written something designed to be “popular.” But the Beobachtungen was intended to be 
just that. Scholars have noted that this essay constitutes “the epitome of popular Kant” 
(Stuckenberg, 220).  Willi Goetschel notes in his Constituting Critique that, “[t]he title of this 
text signals its specific function. Although it must be considered as one of the essays, the 
subjective spin of the term Observations [Beobachtungen] denotes an especially free, open 
form of essay” (Goetschel 59). Instructive and not overly serious in tone, the essay claims in 
the opening paragraph to approach questions of moral feeling with more of “das Auge eines 
Beobachters als des Philosophen” (229). The essay has the feel of a text that is intended to be 
widely read, and indeed, according to one critic, it was one of Kant’s “best-read and most 
successful piece[s] of writing. It thrust Kant into the forefront of ’popular philosophy‘ at the 
time, [and] made him an exemplary reflektierende Schrifsteller” (Zammito 106). But it is 
clear from a reading of the Beobachtungen that Kant not only desired his message to reach a 
broad audience, but he also firmly believed in the informative and instructional purposes of 
his observations. Kant states, “Das Feld der Beobachtung, dieser Besonderheiten der 
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menschlichen Natur erstrecket sich sehr weit und verbirgt annoch einen reichen Vorrat zu 
Entdeckungen, die eben so anmutig als lehrreich sein“ (229). It is clear from the tone of the 
essay that Kant’s writing was intended for a much broader audience than his later critical 
critiques, and was an attempt to reach an expanding reading public that was itself becoming 
increasingly diverse. Serving the dual function of entertaining and educating, Kant’s essay 
addresses an audience for which the concept of difference was an ever-growing concern, a 
difference that for Kant was most ideally conceptualized in the mapping of the universal 
traits of humanity and their various capacities for moral feeling onto an analysis of the 
human temperaments.  
 Through much of Western history, the theory of the four temperaments (the 
melancholic, the sanguine, the choleric, and the phlegmatic) have played an important role in 
not only medicine, but also anthropology, philosophy and ethics. Originally developed by 
Hippocrates and then improved upon by Aristotle and Galen (Kagan 13), by the eighteenth 
century the concept of temperament had come to mean the balance of the four humors: 
phlegm, yellow bile, black bile and blood (Kagan 2).  A perfect balance of humors, however, 
was said to be unachievable. It was rather the natural imbalance of humors that was said to be 
capable of explaining tendencies in human behavior and character, particularly with regard to 
the melancholic, sanguine, and choleric temperaments. In their comprehensive study of 
human temperament Saturn and Melancholy, Raymond Kilbansky, Erwin Panofsky and Fritz 
Saxl explain how Galen’s theory of temperament closely aligned character traits and 
temperament with the four humors: 
 Acuteness and intelligence of the mind came from the bilious humours [choleric], 
 steadiness and solidity from the atrabilious [melancholy], but from the blood 
 [sanguine] simplicity bordering on foolishness. But phlegm by its nature does not 
 contribute to the formation of character (58).  
12 
 
 
 
 In the eighteenth century, the idea that these imbalances of humor could help people 
to better understand each other developed into a genre of enlightenment psychology known 
as Die Kunst, der Menschen Gemüther zu Lesen, or “the art of reading people” (Böhme 269). 
The notion that an understanding of the natural imbalances that exist in all humans could 
have the practical aim of improving relationships and promoting human progress was an 
important component of the Popularphilosophie of ethical and sociopolitical agency that 
emerged during this time period (Zammito 9).  Questions about how to solve the mind-body 
problem and create a more moral and complete society could be practically and conveniently 
explored through an understanding of the interactions among the melancholic, sanguine and 
choleric temperaments that existed in the general population. The passive and cold-blooded 
phlegmatic temperament, however, was commonly and often disdainfully sequestered in its 
own temperament sub-category in eighteenth century temperament discourse (Larrimore 
267); lacking in agency and motivation, the phlegmatic’s character traits did not fit in with 
favored notions of human progress and moral action. But nevertheless, attempts to 
understand the makeup of humanity through the melancholic, sanguine and choleric 
temperaments were a common intellectual undertaking by the time Kant put forth his ideas 
on the subject in the Beobachtungen. 
 It is clear that Kant intended this text to serve a practical moral purpose. Located at 
the end of the chapter entitled “Von den Eigenschaften des Erhabenen und Schönen am 
Menschen überhaupt” (829), Kant’s description of the four temperaments serves as a bridge 
between the general outline of his moral and aesthetic philosophy that comes at the beginning 
of the essay, and his exploration of gender and national character differences that comes at 
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the end.  Kant’s conception of the three different types of virtue corresponds closely to his 
description of three of the four temperaments.  Wahre Tugend, which Kant associates with 
the melancholic temperament, can only exist in an individual who follows principles, and 
who has a “Gefühl von der Schönheit und Würde der Menschlichen Natur” (241).  The 
melancholic temperament “fühlt die Würde seiner eigenen Natur” (234) and is therefore 
aligned with the sublime. Kant emphasizes that the notion of wahre Tugend is most closely 
tied to the melancholic, saying “die echte Tugend also aus Grundsätzen hat etwas an sich, 
was am meisten mit der melancholischen Gemütsverfassung in gemilderten Verstande 
zusammenzustimmen scheinet” (241). He privileges the melancholic temperament over the 
sanguine and choleric, suggesting that it is the only character category that allows one to 
achieve true moral virtue.  
 The second category, adoptierte Tugend, is associated with the sanguine 
temperament, and corresponds with his description of the beautiful. Kant describes this virtue 
as having "mit den wahren Tugenden groβe Ähnlichkeiten, indem sie das Gefühl einer 
unmittelbaren Lust an gütigen und wohlwollenden Handlungen enthalten“ (240).  The 
adoptierte Tugend is most closely associated with the sanguine temperament. Kant says that 
the sanguine has “eine gewisse Weichmütigkeit, die leichtlich in ein warmes Gefühl des 
Mitleidens gesetzt wird” (238). Kant differentiates this sympathy and appreciation for fellow 
human beings from the more virtuous understanding for the beauty and dignity of humanity 
that the melancholic temperament exhibits. The sympathetic behaviors associated with 
adoptierte Tugend are not virtuous like wahre Tugend, but they are beautiful in the way that 
they harmonize with it.  
 The third type of virtue is “das Gefühl vor Ehre und dessen Folge die Scham” (240). 
14 
 
Honor and shame, which are connected with the choleric temperament, are necessary and 
good according to Kant because they motivate people to do good deeds which they might 
otherwise be unlikely to perform. However, the choleric’s behavior has absolutely nothing to 
do with true moral virtue; his motivation to act morally stems not from true virtue or an inner 
feeling of the worth and dignity of all human beings, but rather a superficial notion of the 
way he is perceived by others. Kant states: 
 Der welchen man unter der cholerischen Gemütsbeschaffenheit meinet, hat ein 
 herrschendes Gefühl vor diejenige Art des Erhabenen, welche man das Prächtige 
 nennen kann. Sie ist eigentlich nur der Schimmer der Erhabenheit und eine starke 
 abstechende Farbe, welche den inneren Gehalt der Sache oder Person, der vielleicht 
 nur schlecht und gemein ist, verbirgt und durch den Schein täuschet und rühret (245).    
  
 The choleric, although he has a feel for the sublime and is motivated to act morally 
through honor and shame, is not truly virtuous. His good deeds are not “Grundsätze der 
Tugend, sondern der Ehre, und er hat kein Gefühl vor die Schönheit oder den Wert der 
Handlungen” (246). Furthermore, his superficiality and mere “appearance” of sublimity 
might go so far as to hide his bad inner qualities. 
 The fourth temperament in Kant’s essay, the phlegmatic, lacks both an appropriate 
corresponding virtue category and a thorough analysis. Kant’s tone when referring to this 
type is nothing short of dismissive; it is as if people who are not motivated by feeling and 
therefore disinclined to take action are also not worthy of any discussion.  He states, “Da in 
der phlegmatischen Mischung keine Ingredienzen vom Erhabenen oder Schönen in 
sonderlich merklichem Grade hineinzukommen pflegen, so gehöret diese Gemütseigenschaft 
nicht in dem Zusammenhang unserer Erwägungen“ (246).  
 With that, Kant gradually eliminates the discussion of the phlegmatic from the 
treatise, giving it only one more brief mention in his chapter on national character, where he 
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attributes the phlegmatic’s main characteristics to the Dutch. He says, “Der Holländer ist von 
einer ordentlichen und emsigen Gemütsart, und,  indem er lediglich auf das Nützliche sieht, 
so hat er wenig Gefühl vor dasjenige, was im feineren Verstande schön oder erhaben 
ist“(272). The Dutchman is merely “ein sehr phlegmatisierter Deutsche[r]” (272). Kant’s 
outright dismissal of the phlegmatic temperament is significant because the main 
characteristics of the phlegmatic are a lack of moral feeling and a lack of motivation to moral 
action, both of which are constitute a threat to his proposed ideal moral community. Kant 
states: 
 Niemals ist ein Mensch ohne alle Spuren der feineren Empfindung, allein ein 
 gröβerer Mangel derselben, der Vergleichungsweise auch Fühllosigkeit heiβt, kommt 
 in der Charakter des phlegmatischen, den man sonsten auch so gar der gröbern 
 Triebfedern, als der Geldbegierde etc.etc. beraubt, die wir aber, zusamt andern 
 verschwisterten Neigungen, ihm allenfalls lassen können, weil sie gar nicht in diesen 
 Plan gehören (242). 
 
  
The phlegmatic temperament is not part of Kant’s Plan because a person who possesses no 
moral feeling and therefore no motivation to take action has no role in his practical vision for 
the improvement of humanity. The phlegmatic is very much on the opposite end of the 
spectrum as the melancholic, whose behavior and characteristics take a privileged position 
and therefore play the most important role in Kant’s ideal conception of a morally virtuous 
humanity comprised of a variety of temperaments. 
 However, Kant’s dismissal of the phlegmatic and his privileging of the melancholic is 
problematic when one considers the fact that these temperaments are part of human nature; 
an individual can never change his natural disposition.  If wahre Tugend can only be 
achieved by those who have the melancholic temperament, as Kant seems to suggest, then 
how can those individuals who naturally possess choleric or sanguine temperaments ever 
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hope to become truly moral? For a text that is often singled out for its prejudicial claims, the 
following statement is remarkable.   In a concession that is radically at odds with the narrow-
minded observations made in the chapters on gender and national character, Kant makes a 
concession of how deeply problematic it is to favor one type of human being over another.  
In this statement he acknowledges his own inadequacies, and reveals how he struggles to 
adequately clarify the relationship between the true moral virtue of the melancholic 
disposition, and the good-intentioned yet non-virtuous sanguine and choleric temperaments: 
 Wenn ich die edele und schwache Seite der Menschen wechselsweise bemerke, so 
 verweise ich es mir selbsten, daβ ich nicht denjenigen Standpunkt zu nehmen vermag, 
 von wo diese Abstechungen das groβe Gemälde der ganzen menschlichen Natur 
 gleichwohl in einer ruhrenden Gestalt darstellen. Denn ich bescheide mich gerne: 
 daβ, so ferne es zu dem Entwurfe  der groβen Natur gehöret, diese groteske 
 Stellungen nicht anders als einen edelen Ausdruck geben können, ob man schon viel 
 zu kurzsichtig ist, sie in diesen Verhältnisse zu übersehen (249). 
 
 Aware of the contradictions inherent in his preference for the “edele Seite der 
Menschen” over the “schwache Seite der Menschen” (249), Kant admits that the privileging 
of one over the other is problematic. He is conflicted about the superiority of the melancholic 
temperament, because the choleric and sanguine temperaments are also necessary and good. 
The sanguine temperament is good and beautiful in the way it synthesizes with wahre 
Tugend, and the choleric temperament and the honor and shame it is associated with provide 
a necessary impulse to do good in those individuals who wouldn’t normally be inclined to do 
so.  In an attempt to solve this problem about the superiority of the melancholic, Kant creates 
a scheme in which all three of these temperaments, which occur at different frequencies in 
the population, work together as a cohesive unit for the good of humanity. He states, 
“Endlich ist die Ehrliebe in aller Menschen Herzen obzwar in ungleichen Maβe, verbreitet 
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worden, welches dem Ganzen einen bis zur Bewunderung reizende Schönheit geben muβ“ 
(249). Embracing the differences in temperament that exist in the population as serving a 
crucial purpose in the collective whole, we see Kant here attempting to resolve the problem 
that truly virtuous people are few and far between.  He goes on to explain how the 
melancholic individuals are few in number compared to the sanguine and choleric, but this is 
actually a good thing because “es so leicht geschehen kann, dass man in diesen Grundsätzen 
irre” (249).  The melancholic can easily go astray with his strong principles, and he is kept in 
balance by the more numerous good-natured sanguine and self-interested choleric 
temperaments. These temperaments give the whole community: 
 Haltung und Festigkeit, in dem sie auch ohne ihre Absicht gemeinnützig werden, die 
 notwendigen Bedürfnisse herbeischalten, und die Grundlage hefern, über welche 
 feinere Seelen Schönheit und Wohlgereimtheit verbreiten können (249).  
   
 This synthesized moral community Kant proposes as a defense against the inherent 
problems with the differentiation of the human temperaments is not unlike the synthesis he 
proposes at various other junctures throughout the essay; The German is described as the 
perfect mixture of these very temperaments: “[Der Deutsche] hat eine glückliche Mischung 
in dem Gefühle so wohl des Erhabenen und des Schönen” (272). The difference here is that 
this particular synthesis appears to be created by Kant in response to an acknowledged 
problem with the privileging of one category over another; the moral synthesis he proposes is 
a response to his own awareness that it is problematic to place the sublime (melancholic) 
above the beautiful (sanguine, choleric) in this categorization.  It would not be productive or 
fit in with Kant’s practical project to suggest that individuals who possess the choleric or 
sanguine dispositions are somehow inferior to the melancholic and can never achieve virtue.  
In order to address this problem (or merely sidestep it) he relies on a familiar synthesis to 
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stress that these temperaments supplement each other to benefit a larger whole. The sublime 
melancholic temperament needs the beautiful sanguine and choleric to keep it from being 
misled by its strong principles. The balancing of these temperaments on a collective level, 
which leads to the formation of a “Gemälde von prächtigem Ausdruck” (849) is a way for 
Kant to avoid suggesting that the melancholic temperament is somehow superior to the other 
natural dispositions.  Unlike his explorations of gender and national character, the discussion 
of temperament and his attempt to synthesize the diverse human dispositions into a collective 
whole illustrates how the favoring of the sublime over the beautiful can be problematic.  
 But this “Gemälde von prächtigem Ausdruck” that Kant advocates is significant for 
another reason. This collective synthesis that requires the embrace of the variety of 
temperaments that exist in human beings should be formed in such a way that “mitten unter 
groβer Mannigfaltigkeit Einheit hervorleuchtet und das eine glückliche Mischung Schönheit 
und Würde an sich zeiget” (250). The emphasis here on embracing difference and the 
acknowledgment of the importance of the beauty and dignity of human nature illustrates an 
important acceptance of human diversity that serves a practical purpose. The embrace of 
difference is evident from the opening lines of the Beobachtungen, where Kant 
acknowledges that each individual has its own unique moral feeling:  
 Die verschiedene Empfindungen des Vergnügens, oder des Verdrusses, beruhen nicht 
 so sehr auf der Beschaffenheit der äuβeren Dinge, die sie erregen, als auf das jedem 
 Menschen eigene Gefühl, dadurch mit Lust oder Unlust gerührt zu werden“ (229).  
 It is through an understanding of these differences where the individual can overcome 
his own inclinations in order to be a part of a community that virtuously embraces him. At 
the conclusion of his chapter on temperament in the Beobachtungen, Kant explains how his 
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system embraces different individuals as each playing a distinct role within the collective 
moral whole: 
 Denn indem ein jeder auf der groβen Bühne, seinen herrschenden Neigungen gemäβ, 
 die Handlungen verfolgt, so wird er zugleich durch einem geheimen Antrieb 
 bewogen, in Gedanken auβer sich selbst einen Standpunkt zu nehmen, um den 
 Anstand zu beurteilen, den sein Betragen hat, wie es aussehe und dem Zuschauer in 
 die Augen falle (250). 
 Kant argues that we can only form a community based on the dignity and worth of all 
human beings by embracing and understanding our differences, most especially differences 
in temperament, because they affect our ability to act morally virtuous, and by appreciating 
the beauty and dignity of all human beings. In the footnotes to this section of the essay the 
Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen, which were added to the text in the year after its 
original publication, Kant insists that underneath our differences, there is a beauty and 
dignity of all humanity that unites human beings despite their differences.  Kant points out 
his indebtedness to Rousseau for teaching him to appreciate this dignity in this famous 
passage from the Bemerkungen: 
 Ich bin selbst aus Neigung ein Forscher. Ich fühle den ganzen Durst nach Erkenntnis 
 und die begierige Unruhe darin weiter zu kommen oder auch die Zufriedenheit bey 
 jedem Erwerb. Es war eine Zeit da ich glaubte dieses allein könnte die Ehre der 
 Menschheit machen und ich verachtete den Pöbel der von nichts weis. Rousseau hat 
 mich zurecht gebracht. Dieser verblendende Vorzug verschwindet, ich lerne die 
 Menschen ehren und ich würde mich unnützer finden wie den gemeinen Arbeiter 
 wenn ich nicht glaubete, daβ die Betrachtung allen übrigen einen Werth ertheilen 
 könne, die Rechte der Menschheit herzustellen (Kant 44). 
 Kant’s change of heart about the dignity and worth of every human being that he 
references and attributes to Rousseau in the Bemerkungen encouraged Kant to see virtue not 
as something that only exists for a privileged group, but as something that springs from the 
inherent dignity and worth that belongs to all human beings. Given this essay’s 
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preoccupation, particularly in the final two chapters on gender and race, with pointing out 
differences between men and women and Europeans and non-Europeans that clearly 
privilege certain groups over others, this statement may be surprising. These footnotes are 
clearly an indication that Kant acknowledged some of the problems with his own 
categorizations. According to these remarks, moral feeling appears to be universal; it is a 
quality that unites human beings rather than dividing them or accentuating their differences:  
 Demnach kann wahre Tugend nur auf Grundsätze gepropft werden, welche, je 
 allgemeiner sie sind, desto erhabener und edler wird sie. Diese Grundsätze sind nicht 
 spekulativische Regeln, sondern das Bewuβtsein eines Gefühls, das in jedem 
 menschlichen Busen lebt und sich viel weiter als auf die besondere Gründe des 
 Mitleidens und der Gefälligkeit erstreckt. Ich glaube, ich fasse alles zusammen, wenn 
 ich sage: es sei das Gefühl von der Schönheit und der Würde der menschlichen Natur 
 (239). 
 Although this text is often singled out for its undoubtedly troubling remarks on 
gender and race, Kant’s observations on human temperament in the Beobachtungen can 
provide key insight about his developing theories of the universality of humanity and his 
attempts to deal with difference and diversity in the human population. Kant’s recognition of 
the problems of privileging the melancholic temperament as the only character type capable 
of achieving true virtue reflects how human nature, something that moves beyond the 
boundaries of gender and nationality, plays a critical role in Kant’s moral philosophy. This 
essay represents one of Kant’s early attempts to account for the role of difference in the 
human population and to embrace diversity as a crucial part of a practical and achievable 
morally virtuous community. The significance of the variety of characteristics and behaviors 
that exist within all humans is of utmost importance to Kant’s practical moral philosophy. 
Temperament is a category of human difference which is singled out in this essay in a 
different manner than gender and national character. In this chapter Kant clearly 
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acknowledges the critical problem of placing the sublime category in the superior position 
above the beautiful. The link between human temperament and the ability to achieve moral 
virtue is thus of critical importance to Kant’s philosophy. Temperament is the category that 
speaks the most directly to the ability of humanity as a collective whole to embrace the 
universality of human dignity and become a virtuous whole composed of a variety of 
temperaments. But as we shall see in the remaining chapters of the Beobachtungen, the belief 
in the inherent dignity and worth of all humanity that is the driving force behind this section 
of the work is a sentiment that does not strongly resurface in Kant’s observations on gender 
and national character. As we have seen in this chapter, singling out and privileging the 
melancholic temperament as the disposition most suited for achieving true sublime virtue is 
problematic for Kant. But as we will see in the following chapter, he is significantly less 
conflicted in his privileging of certain genders and nationalities above others. 
  
 
 
 
Privileging the Male: Kant’s Gender Politics in “Von dem Unterschiede des Erhabenen 
und Schönen in dem Gegenverhältniβ beider Geschlechter” 
 
 At the end of his discussion on temperament, Kant leaves us on an upbeat note. 
Praising all of humanity for its weaknesses as well as its strengths, Kant insists that “mitten 
unter groβer Mannigfaltigkeit Einheit hervorleuchtet, und das Ganze der moralischen Natur 
Schönheit und Würde an sich zeiget” (250). It would seem as if Kant’s picture of an ideal 
moral community is all-embracing, encompassing a humanity which is comprised of a 
diverse set of temperaments.  The flaws of one temperament are compensated for by the 
assets of another, and the diverse human dispositions ideally come together to achieve a 
collective moral whole which is both beautiful and sublime. But as a close reading of this 
section has demonstrated, this picture of a universal humanity composed of diverse 
personalities is not without its problems and contradictions. Kant clearly privileges the 
melancholic as the individual who is the most capable of achieving true moral virtue. His 
admittance of the inherent problems with this categorization reveals how in this particular 
section of the treatise, Kant is troubled by the complications this privileging creates. But this 
uneasiness about privileging the sublime over the beautiful that we have seen in this critical 
chapter of the essay appears to be entirely absent from the remaining two sections on gender 
and national character.  These final two chapters of the work have been the most heavily 
denounced for their sexism and racism. In his third chapter, entitled Von dem Unterschiede 
des Erhabenen und Schönen in dem Gegenverhältniβ beider Geschlechter, Kant has been 
criticized for his ruthless portrayal of women as completely incapable of finer moral feeling. 
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Paul de Man claims, “Considerations on the feminine languor and passivity, unfavorably 
contrasted with male energy,” make for “difficult reading” (DeMan 138, qtd. in Shapiro & 
Sica). But although this chapter certainly contains statements which make for “difficult 
reading,” there is more to this chapter than first meets the eye.  
 Kant begins in the first few pages of this chapter with a statement similar to the one in 
which he ended the previous one. He calls the difference between men and women the 
“reizenden Unterschied…den die Natur zwischen zwei Menschengattungen hat treffen 
wollen“ (252) and stresses, “es ist hier nicht genug sich vorzustellen dass man Menschen vor 
sich habe, man muss zugleich nicht aus der Acht lassen, dass diese Menschen nicht von 
einerlei Art sind” (252). These distinctions should be esteemed as well as respected as rigid 
categories. All attempts at moral perfection of either sex must take these differences in 
character into account. Kant also emphasizes that people are all different, and that these 
differences should be valued and understood in order for humanity to progress towards a 
morally perfect whole. In language that echoes the closing remarks of the previous chapter, 
Kant remarks that this distinction is critical for any attempts to morally improve either sex, 
and that the natural distinction between man and woman is something that should be not only 
well understood, but also embraced as natural, beautiful and positive. The all-encompassing 
nature of this last statement seems to at first suggest that a similar strategy will be employed 
in this chapter as in the previous chapter on temperament. The gender differences will be 
highlighted and categorized as either beautiful or sublime, the sublime will be privileged 
above the beautiful, and it will be suggested that the varying degrees of beauty and sublimity 
in man and woman should ideally unite to form a morally perfect whole. But the note of 
acceptance and all-inclusiveness that we see in the closing statements of the previous chapter, 
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in which the dignity of all human beings is the driving current, by the end of the chapter on 
gender becomes increasingly less apparent and indeed is almost entirely absent from this 
section of the treatise.  In this chapter of my work I will show how Kant is here engaging in a 
reworking of his “Gemälde von prächtigem Ausdruck” in order to clearly define the 
acceptable role of women within this ideal picture of humanity. While in his chapter on 
temperament Kant distinctly exhibits a degree of reluctance to claim that only the 
melancholic can achieve true moral virtue, he shows virtually no restraint in completely 
excluding women from the realm of the truly virtuous sublime. It is my contention that 
although Kant is certainly less troubled by the privileging of the sublime in this section, his 
repeated need to rewrite and rejustify his own rules throughout the chapter in order to create 
this “Gemälde von prächtigem Ausdruck” is a technique that deserves closer attention.  I 
argue that this chapter is less about what de Man calls “feminine languor and passivity, 
unfavorably contrasted with male energy” and more about the calculated reworking of his 
own theory to create a gender hierarchy which reinforces the status quo by granting women 
limited moral agency. While Kant certainly appears not to be troubled by the privileging of 
the sublime male over the beautiful female, his need to rework his own system to justify the 
exclusion of women from the community of truly morally virtuous human beings reflects an 
awareness of the contradictions inherent in his own categorizations.  
 Throughout this chapter the beautiful and the sublime serve to differentiate the sexes 
and to reinforce gender norms. The qualities of the beautiful and the sublime as they are 
present in the individual should unite in such a way as to ideally express the qualities 
appropriate to the person’s sex. Although Kant mentions that the qualities of the beautiful 
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and the sublime can be found in both men and women, the sublime is the defining 
characteristic of the male and the beautiful is the ideal quality of the female: 
  
 …vielmehr erwartet man, das ein jedes Geschlecht beide vereinbare, doch so,  
 dass von einem Frauenzimmer alle andere Vorzüge sich nur dazu vereinigen sollen, 
 um den Charakter des Schönen zu erhöhen, welcher der eigentliche Beziehungspunkt 
 ist, und dagegen unter den männlichen Eigenschaften das Erhabene als das 
 Kennzeichen seiner Art deutlich hervorstehe (251).  
              
 Throughout this section, Kant repeatedly emphasizes that moral perfection can only 
be attained when the qualities of the male sublime and the female beautiful are perfectly 
united. Kant is clear that these categorizations of what feelings are appropriate for males and 
females are quite rigid and must be adhered to if this perfect moral union is ever to become a 
possibility. Kant is very explicit about what can happen if these strict gender roles are not 
observed. A woman who exhibits character traits which are typical of the male sex might as 
well have a beard (“mag nur immerhin noch einen Bart dazu haben” (51). Laborious learning 
is also not for them, and although they might succeed in it, doing so is a threat to their 
femininity and can “vertilgen die Vorzüge, die ihrem Geschlechte eigenthümlich sind” and 
can “die Reize schwächen, wodurch sie ihre groβe Gewalt über das andere Geschlecht 
ausüben” (51). Women who attempt to achieve success in academic learning will only 
succeed in losing their feminine charm and their power over the male sex, undermining 
Kant’s whole system and destroying the natural order of things.  According to Kant, women 
are fundamentally different from men in their understanding of how the world works; they 
are unable to form principles and are incapable of a sense of moral duty. Women are 
motivated to action, not by moral principles or duty, but rather by feelings alone. Kant writes: 
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 Die Tugend des Frauenzimmers ist eine schöne Tugend. Die des männlichen 
 Geschlechts soll eine edle Tugend sein. Sie werden das Böse vermeiden, nicht weil es 
 unrecht sondern  weil es häβlich ist…Nichts von Sollen, nichts von Müssen, nichts 
 von Schuldigkeit. Das Frauenzimmer ist aller Befehle und alles mürrischen Zwanges 
 unleidlich (255).  
 
 
 The true virtue of woman is a beautiful one (ist eine schöne Tugend), and will never 
be anything more than that. The virtue of man, however, is a noble one (or at least it ideally 
should be : “soll eine edle Tugend sein”). Inherent in Kant’s language is the assertion that 
only men are capable of realizing their moral duty, while women are necessarily excluded 
from this process of enlightened self-mastery and discovery. Unable to follow moral law, 
women will always do only that which pleases them.  
 Throughout the text the qualities that are associated with the sanguine temperament 
are those that are reserved for women. Like the sanguine, they possess “gütige und 
wohlwollende Empfindungen, ein feines Gefühl für Anständigkeit und eine gefällige Seele” 
(255). But unlike the sanguine, women do not possess the same adoptierte Tugend , or 
“adoptive virtues” that men of the sanguine temperament can exhibit. In the chapter on 
temperament, Kant described the adoptierte Tugend in these terms:  
 In Ansehung der Schwäche der menschlichen Natur und der geringen Macht, welche 
 das allgemeine moralische Gefühl über die mehreste Herzen ausüben würde, hat die 
 Vorsehung dergleichen hülfleistende Triebe als Supplemente der Tugend in uns 
 gelegt,  die, indem sie einige auch ohne Grundsätze zu schönen Handlungen bewegen, 
 zugleich andern, die durch diese letztere regiert werden einen gröβeren Stoβ und 
 einen stärkern  Antrieb dazu geben können…Ich kann sie daher adoptierte Tugenden 
 nennen, diejenige aber die auf Grundsätzen beruhet die echte Tugend…Diese 
 adoptierte Tugenden haben gleichwohl mit den wahren Tugenden groβe Ähnlichkeit, 
 indem sie das Gefühl einer unmittelbaren Lust an gütigen und wohlwollenden 
 Handlungen  enthalten. (240) 
  
 Those individuals who are of the sanguine temperament are those who readily possess 
these adoptive virtues, which closely resemble true virtues and motivate those who otherwise 
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have no principles to do good deeds.  Traits like sympathy and complaisance, qualities that 
Kant later insists are fundamentally female characteristics, can be given this adoptive virtue 
status because they motivate those of the sanguine temperament to benevolent actions.  
 Kant revisits these adoptive virtues in his chapter on gender, but he makes a 
noteworthy exception to his prior judgment about what qualifies as an adoptierte Tugend. 
Using strikingly similar language to describe the female virtues as he does to describe the 
adoptierte Tugend in the previous chapter on temperament, Kant describes how “die 
Vorsehung [hat] in ihren Busen gütige und wohlwollende Empfindungen, ein feines Gefühl 
für Anständigkeit und eine gefällige Seele gegeben” (255). Whereas for the sanguine male 
these qualities would no doubt be associated with adoptierte Tugend, not quite virtuous but 
still capable of motivating him to beautiful actions, for the female Kant makes a critical 
exception to the rule. In the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen he describes the female 
schöne Tugend as, “in einem strengen Urtheil adoptierte Tugend genannt; hier, da sie um des 
Geschlechtscharakters willen eine günstige Rechtfertigung verdienet, heiβt sie überhaupt eine 
schöne Tugend“ (255).  
 The language used to describe the virtues attributed to women echoes almost exactly 
the description from the previous chapter on adoptive virtues. Given the general „Schwäche 
der menschlichen Natur“ (239) and the fact that most individuals do not yet possess true 
sublime feelings of moral virtue,  divine Providence has placed within the sanguine 
individual a certain motivation to benevolent actions to make up for this weakness. These 
virtues bear such a close resemblance to true virtues that they can almost be mistaken for 
them. But for women it is a different story. Women are also inherently weak and possess no 
true feelings of moral virtue, and Providence has also placed certain beautiful qualities within 
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them to make up for this lack of finer feeling. But when these virtues are attributed to women 
they are not adoptierte Tugend, they are merely schöne Tugend, as even the appearance of 
true moral virtue is not appropriate for the female sex. Here we see Kant rewriting his own 
rules in order to keep women firmly within the realm of the beautiful and the sanguine, and 
any disruption to the delicate balance in the relationship between men and women would 
cause his entire system to crumble. Men need women to complement their sublimity, and 
women who go beyond the boundaries of what is appropriate to their sex are a threat to 
men’s ability to achieve true sublime moral virtue.  
 Here we can see that the charges of misogyny that have been railed against this 
chapter of the treatise are no doubt justified if we look at them from a contemporary 
perspective. It is clear that the “Gefühl von der Schönheit und Würde der menschlichen 
Natur” (239) that is a defining current of the previous section on human temperament does 
not seem to apply to women. Women must be excluded from the realm of the sublime and 
should be subordinate to male reason. The contradictions inherent in the unequivocal male 
and female roles that Kant and other Enlightenment thinkers allow cannot be fully reconciled 
or defended from a modern perspective. But if we look at the lengths that Kant goes to 
throughout this chapter to keep women firmly within the realm of the beautiful/ sanguine we 
can clearly see Kant struggling to keep women rooted in the domestic sphere, and a 
repeatedly searching for ways to defend and justify women’s exclusion from the ability to 
achieve true moral virtue. The very fact that Kant felt the need to reiterate in the 
Bemerkungen (written after the essay’s original publication) that schöne Tugend as opposed 
to adoptierte Tugend should be used when it refers to women shows an attempt to legitimize 
an argument that is at odds with sentiments from the previous chapter. The belief in the 
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dignity and worth of all human beings and the universality of moral feeling that becomes the 
dominant theme of the chapter on human temperament is here seemingly absent, or at least 
reworked to place women in clearly-defined social roles. It becomes apparent that the 
“universality of moral feeling” only truly applies to men. In order for Kant’s system to work, 
women exist to help men become morally (and sublimely) perfect, and in so doing they too 
can achieve their own distinctly female (and beautiful) perfection.  In this way a delicate 
balance is achieved in which the union between male and female is a sublime and beautiful 
expression of moral virtue.  
 This delicate balance relies heavily on what Kant repeatedly calls the female 
“natürliche Reize” (53) and more importantly, the male ability to resist and control it. 
Women do not only exist to complement the male and his sublime moral virtue, but also to 
allow him use his principles to control his susceptibility to the tempting charms of the 
beautiful. Just as individuals of the melancholic temperament have the ability to resist the 
“gaukelnde Reize des Schönen” (242), so must the sublime male strive not to fall prey to the 
female’s deceptive charm.  Kant’s point about the appropriate way to master the feminine 
charm is perhaps best illustrated in a passage from the previous chapter, in which Kant uses 
the example of Alceste and Adraste to illustrate the difference between sublime and beautiful 
sentiments.  The character of Alceste from Moliere’s comedic opera Le Misanthrope ou 
l'Atrabilaire amoureux is used to exemplify how those individuals of the sanguine 
temperament react to their wives’ natürliche Reize. Kant says: 
 Der muntere und freundliche Alcest sagt: „Ich liebe und schätze meine Frau, denn sie 
 ist schön, schmeichelhaft und klug.“ Wie aber, wenn sie nun durch Krankheit 
 einstellt, durch Alter mürrisch, und, nach dem die erste Bezauberung verschwunden, 
 euch nicht klüger scheinen würde wie jede andere? (243) 
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 The man who does not possess the true feeling for the sublime that is unique to the 
melancholic temperament is unable to look past his wife’s beauty, appearance and 
“Bezauberung.” He is not capable of resisting her feminine charm, which does nothing more 
than hide the fact that she is no different than any other woman. To contrast this example, 
Kant uses Moliere’s character Adraste from another comedy Le Sicilien ou L’Amour Peintre, 
whose relationship with his wife is described by Kant as the following: 
 
 Nehmet dagegen den wohlwollenden und gefetzten Adrast, welcher bei sich denkt: 
 Ich werde dieser Person liebreich und mit Achtung begegnen, denn sie ist meine Frau. 
 Diese Gesinnung ist edel und groβmütig” (243). 
 
 According to Kant, an important quality of the melancholic is the ability to control 
one’s impulses with regards to the opposite sex. Those who treat their wives with respect out 
of principle, not because of their feminine beauty or charm are the most noble and virtuous. 
Here we see the sanguine and beautiful woman as both charming and powerful. Attraction to 
that charm and power inherently weakens men and must be controlled and mastered if one 
hopes to achieve true sublime moral virtue. For Kant, it is the melancholic who is the best 
equipped to master and control the female.  
 If we take these remarks at face value, it is apparent that they are brimming with 
contradictions. How can the same author who lauded the universality of feeling in every 
human being in the previous section of the essay on temperament in the next breath exclude 
women from it for their inability to develop rational faculties? While Kant’s argument is no 
doubt inconsistent, a closer look at this section reveals its author as fully aware of the 
potentially problematic nature of his comments. He says, “Ich glaube schwerlich, dass das 
schöne Geschlecht der Grundsätze fähig sei, und ich hoffe dadurch nicht zu beleidigen, denn 
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diese sind auch äußerst selten beim männlichen“ (255). Although this statement could be 
described as a rather feeble attempt to avoid offending his audience, its inclusion in the 
passage reveals an anticipation of potential criticism. In fact, Kant inserts many of these 
conciliatory remarks throughout the chapter. When comparing the qualities of the “fair sex” 
with the “noble sex,” he defends these categorizations by saying, “Hiedurch wird nun nicht 
verstanden: Dass das Frauenzimmer edler Eigenschaften ermangelte, oder das männliche 
Geschlecht der Schönheiten gänzlich entbehren müsste“ (251). On the contrary, he argues 
that women do indeed have qualities of both the beautiful and sublime, but that these 
qualities should be united so that they properly and primarily enhance the character of the 
beautiful. In another such interjection, Kant asks his readers not to interpret the female 
association with the beautiful as a complete lack of understanding.  He writes: 
 Man wird mir hoffentlich die Herzählen der männlichen Eigenschaften, in so ferne sie            
 jenen parallel sind, schenken, und sich befriedigen beide nur in der 
 Gegeneinanderhalten  zu betrachten. Das schöne Geschlecht hat eben so wohl 
 Verstand als das männliche, nur es ist ein schöner Verstand. Der unsrige soll ein 
 tiefer Verstand sein, welches ein Ausdruck ist, der einerlei mit dem Erhabenen 
 bedeutet” (252).  
  
 To a present-day reader, this excuse is insufficient, if not downright patronizing. 
Again, there is an implicit suggestion within the very language itself that women are 
naturally excluded from the ability to achieve true understanding. Women’s understanding is 
and always will be only a beautiful one (ist ein schöner Verstand). Men’s understanding, 
however, has the ability to become something deeper, or at least it ideally should be striving 
for greater depth (soll ein tiefer Verstand sein). There is nothing about the character of 
woman, however, that can be socially conditioned; she is by her very nature incapable of 
achieving true moral virtue or breaking out of her natural role as wife and mother. Women 
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can achieve virtue only insofar as they help men improve their noble character or if they can 
appreciate the noble qualities to be found within them:  
 Das Frauenzimmer hat ein vorzügliches Gefühl vor das Schöne so ferne es ihnen 
 selbst zukommt, aber vor das Edle in so weit es am männlichen Geschlechte 
 angetroffen wird…Dagegen fordert sie alle diese Eigenschaften am Manne und die 
 Erhabenheit ihrer Seele zeigt sich nur darin, dass sie diese edle Eigenschaften zu 
 schätzen weiss so ferne sie bei ihm anzutreffen sein. (264) 
 
  
 It is clear that the closest women can approach to achieving virtue is through 
appreciating those sublime qualities that men possess. Women can only be noble in so far as 
they “edelen und verfeinern selbst das männliche Geschlecht” (252) with their Schönheit. But 
these repeated interjections throughout this chapter which defend and justify the allotted role 
of women within his system should not be ignored. While it would seem that in the previous 
chapter on human temperament Kant is advocating a picture of a diverse but all-
encompassing humanity that embraces flaws and achieves a perfect moral balance, this 
chapter tells a different story. The chapter on gender reveals how Kant’s picture of a 
universal humanity (which in his chapter on temperament appears to be all-inclusive) must 
be adjusted to exclude women from achieving sublime moral virtue.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Privileging the European: Kant’s Observations on Nationalcharakter 
 
  
 The section of the essay titled „Von den Nationalcharakteren, in so ferne sie auf dem 
Unterschiedlichen Gefühl des Erhabenen und Schönen beruhen“ begins with a footnote that 
reads like a disclaimer for the entire chapter. Written after the original publication of the text 
as part of the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen, Kant begins this section with a statement 
reminding his readers that indeed all nations can possess individuals with the capacity for 
moral feeling: 
 Meine Absicht ist gar nicht, die Charaktere der Völkerschaften ausführlich zu 
 schildern, sondern ich entwerfe nur einige Züge, die das Gefühl des Erhabenen und 
 Schönen an ihnen ausdrucken. Man kann leicht erachten, dass an dergleichen 
 Zeichnung nur eine leidliche Richtigkeit könne verlangt werden, dass die Urbilder 
 davon nur in dem groβen Haufen derjenigen, die auf ein feineres Gefühl Anspruch 
 machen, hervorstechen, und dass es keiner Nation an Gemütsarten fehle, welche die 
 vortrefflichste Eigenschaften von dieser Art vereinbaren.(267) 
  
 As with many of the conciliatory remarks in the Bemerkungen, this footnote reflects 
Kant’s perpetual need within the text to justify his categorizations or further explain its 
contradictions.  Acknowledging his own weakness as an observer of the world’s people, Kant 
emphasizes that a truly detailed portrayal is not his goal here (such an analysis would no 
doubt prove quite difficult for Kant, who never strayed far from Königsberg and had little to 
no contact with non-Europeans throughout his lifetime (Goetschel 31). As we have seen in 
his chapter on gender, Kant feels the need throughout the text to repeatedly re-justify his 
claims, revealing himself as rather conflicted about the contradictions in his observations.  
While this section of the essay begins with appeasing remarks that anticipate a critique of his 
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broad generalizations, this footnote by no means sets the tone for the remainder of the 
chapter. It is this section of the treatise which is most at odds with his chapter on 
temperament, and the chapter that is the most troubling to contemporary readers. While it is 
easy to dismiss these unfounded racial claims as mere prejudice, I propose that it is 
worthwhile to examine these troubling statements more thoroughly as long as we keep in 
mind the intellectual and historical context from which they arose. They are symptomatic of 
a broader Enlightenment discourse that repeatedly sought to use reason itself to justify the 
exclusion of non-Europeans from the realm of rational and moral human subjectivity.  In this 
chapter I will argue that this section of the essay is most clearly at odds with Kant’s belief in 
the “beauty and dignity of human nature.” By going to great lengths to define the non-white, 
non-European as comparably incapable of moral-self improvement, Kant establishes that the 
physical characteristics of race are indicators of a person’s ability to become morally 
educated, an ability that he earlier stated to be a basic defining characteristic of the human 
being. I will begin by briefly sketching out how this chapter fits in with Kant’s work in the 
fields of anthropology and physical geography.  By looking at this chapter of the work as 
symptomatic of a broader Enlightenment discourse which was deeply troubled by the idea of 
race, the prejudicial claims this essay puts forth can be better understood and more fruitfully 
analyzed. I will then proceed to a close reading of the text, in which I will show how 
although the chapter begins with an apparent concession that there are individuals in all 
nations who possess moral feeling, the bulk of this chapter is dedicated to creating a system 
which defines the white male European as the ideal moral subject. The belief in the 
“Schönheit und Würde” that was the dominant theme of the chapter on temperament is here 
almost entirely absent.  Central to Kant’s thinking on anthropology and physical geography, 
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Kant’s categorizations on national character in the Beobachtungen are concerned primarily 
with rewriting his own concept of “universal humanity” from his chapter on temperament so 
that it effectively excludes non-Europeans from the realm of morally thinking and feeling 
subjects.   
 Like many members of the eighteenth-century reading public, Kant was an avid 
reader of travel narratives. His interest in distant peoples and cultures formed the basis of his 
lectures on physical geography, which he gave over a period of twenty-five years and which 
were his most widely-attended university lectures (Wood 2). Kant’s establishment of the 
academic discipline of physical geography coincided with a general Enlightenment era 
fascination with “foreign” peoples. Writings which paired empirical observations (or claimed 
empirical observations) of alien cultures and philosophical enquiries into human society 
gained an intense popularity during this age, and many of these writings encouraged the 
emergence of the modern discipline of anthropology. P.J. Marshall and Glyndwr Williams 
note that during this time, “reports about the peoples of the world were acquiring a new value 
as the raw material for the attempts to analyze man and nature that came to be known as the 
European Enlightenment” (7). During this time, writers like Montesquieu, Swift, Voltaire 
and Rousseau, employed techniques of ethnographic description and observation in their 
widely-read fictional accounts of non-Europeans. The fascination with travel during the 
Enlightenment and the literary and philosophical explorations of foreign cultures it provoked 
were in fact, as Wolff and Cipolloni and many others reiterate, attempts to use the “alien, 
exotic, primitive, savage, and barbarous” (xii) to critically examine modern Western 
“civilized” culture.  
 If the examination of exotic and faraway cultures that appeared in travel narratives 
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and other writings during this time can be viewed as the beginnings of modern anthropology, 
it is easy to see how Kant’s Beobachtungen is indeed reflective of this type of observational 
and empirical discourse. But it should also be noted that Kant’s conception of 
“anthropology” as outlined in his lectures and writings on the subject differs dramatically 
from what defines the field today, and even from what modern anthropologists traditionally 
view as the historical beginnings of the discipline during Kant’s lifetime. When Kant first 
introduced the discipline and began his lectures on anthropology and physical geography at 
the university at Königsberg in the 1750s, he viewed these two fields of study as 
complementary. Kant viewed physical geography as the study of the “natural condition of the 
earth and what is contained on it: seas, continents, mountains, rivers, the atmosphere, man, 
animals, plants and minerals” (qtd. in Eze 202).  As a part of nature, human beings are 
necessarily included for study as part of the discipline of physical geography. But within this 
framework, Kant argued that nature could be manifested within the human being both 
externally and internally, in the body and in the soul. While the external body is physical, the 
internal soul is psychological and moral. Kant believed that when the discipline of physical 
geography, which concerns itself with the physical and external realm of the body, combined 
with anthropology, or the study of the moral and internal realm of the soul, the result was the 
pursuit of a full range of knowledge on the subject of human nature (Eze 202).  While 
physical geography is primarily concerned with the human being as it exists in its physical 
external reality, anthropology as Kant understood it was devoted to the study of the inner 
nature of the human as a free moral agent. Thus, Kant’s recognition of the unique internal 
and moral side of human nature that goes beyond mere physical existence in the external 
world is what defines his “pragmatic” anthropology. Pragmatic anthropology is concerned 
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with the study of the inner moral structure of the human being, and is “pragmatic” in the 
sense that it seeks to understand how this structure can and should shape the future of human 
existence. Kant’s conception of the twin disciplines of physical geography and anthropology 
as reflective of both the physical external body and the internal moral soul. But if we view 
Kant’s discussion on national character in the final section of the Beobachtungen as forming 
the foundation of his thinking on anthropology and physical geography, we can immediately 
see how Kant’s outline of different nationalities and their relative capacity for moral feeling 
is deeply problematic. Although Kant viewed anthropology and physical geography as 
separate disciplines, in this section of the work we can see how the two overlap in a troubling 
way. Throughout this chapter Kant uses physical, observable characteristics in the external 
world to make judgments about the inner moral structure of the human being.  As we will see 
in a close examination of the text, Kant’s chapter on national character in the Beobachtungen, 
is concerned with defining the potential for moral progress and growth as one of the 
fundamental characteristics of the human subject.  This definition allows him to completely 
exclude certain groups from this realm and project the white male European as the ideal 
human being who is most capable of achieving his true moral potential.  
 In the beginning of this fourth chapter, before he begins to outline the national 
characters and their varying degrees of feeling for the beautiful and sublime, Kant makes a 
critical claim. He states that he is guided in his observations by the assumption that the 
mental character of a people can be determined by what moral capacities they have. He 
claims: 
  
 Die Gemütscharaktere der Völkerschaften sind am kenntlichsten bei demjenigen,  
 was an ihnen moralisch ist; um deswillen wollen wir noch das verschiedene  
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 Gefühl derselben in Ansehung des Erhabenen und Schönen aus diesem   
 Gesichtspunkte in Erwägung  ziehen”(269) 
 
 But if we turn again here to the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen, we are once 
more presented with a kind of disclaimer, in which Kant reiterates his previous statement 
about sketching only the general features that make a people prone to feelings of either the 
beautiful or sublime. This time, however, he is even more forceful:  
  
 Es ist kaum nötig, dass ich hier meine vorige Entschuldigung wiederhole. In jedem 
 Volke enthält der feinste Teil rühmliche Charaktere von aller Art, und wen ein oder 
 anderer Tadel treffen sollte, der wird, wenn er fein genug ist, seinen Vorteil 
 verstehen, der darauf ankommt, dass er jeden andern seinem Schicksale überläβt, sich 
 selbst aber ausnimmt.  (269).  
 
  
 As we have seen in the chapter on gender, Kant again finds it necessary (albeit “kaum 
nötig,” but still nevertheless necessary) to defend himself. Aware of the potential 
contradictions that could arise out of suggesting that not all nationalities possess moral 
feeling, Kant later added this disclaimer into the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen as an 
afterthought to defend against possible criticism. Kant insists that in every nation there are in 
fact individuals who possess the ability to have finer feeling, and these people should 
consider themselves an exception to the rule. Here we can see vestiges of the language used 
in the chapter on temperament, in which the universality of moral feeling and the belief in the 
dignity and worth of all human beings was the dominant message. But this disclaimer also 
makes clear that these individuals that belong to the “feinster Teil” of a given nation should 
essentially do what they can to enhance their own superior moral feelings while dismissing 
the rest of their countrymen as naturally incapable of achieving such a privileged position.  
By reemphasizing that his analysis relies heavily on generalities rather than individual 
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characters, Kant admits that there can be instances where exceptional individuals do not fit 
within these broad categorizations. But ultimately, as we shall see in the remainder of the 
essay, Kant believes that the ability to cultivate one’s “moral feeling” appears to be the very 
foundation upon which the belief in the dignity and worth of the human being is based. It 
becomes clear that Kant does not believe that this ability to improve oneself morally is found 
in large quantities outside of Europe. Those “races” which Kant believes are generally unable 
to develop rational or moral faculties are shown to be excluded from his “Gemälde von 
prächtigem Ausdruck.” As we have seen in the previous chapter on gender, it unfortunately 
becomes clear in these final two chapters that the “universality” of moral feeling that was so 
central to Kant’s system in the chapter on temperament really only applies to white male 
Europeans.  
 Kant moves forward with his analysis and begins with his descriptions of the various 
European nations, focusing at first primarily on the English, Spanish, Italian and French and 
comments on the varying degrees of beauty and sublimity within each. Particularly 
interesting is his description of the French, which is remarkably similar to his treatment of 
women in the previous chapter. The French have an extraordinary sense for the feeling of the 
beautiful, and while they do posses sublime qualities, these are subordinated by the beautiful 
and are best expressed when they harmonize with it: 
 Der Franzose hat ein herrliches Gefühl vor das moralisch Schöne. Er ist artig, höflich 
 und gefällig…Selbst seine erhabene Empfindungen, deren er nicht wenige hat, sind 
 dem Gefühle des Schönen untergeordnet und bekommen nur ihre Stärke durch die 
 Zusammenstimmung mit dem letzteren (270). 
  
 He goes on to describe the Frenchman’s mannerisms as effeminate and their society 
as unusually infatuated with and oriented towards women. “Das Frauenzimmer gibt in 
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Frankreich allen Gesellschaften und allem Umgange den Ton” (270). He then suggests that 
because men in France are flirtatious like women, they do not properly honor them. He notes 
that Rousseau once observed while staying in France that “ein Frauenzimmer neimals etwas 
mehr als ein groβes Kind werde“(271). Kant claims to disagree with this statement and 
asserts that the reason Rousseau wrote it was most likely because he had observed the way 
women are treated in France and was upset that they were not given more honor and respect. 
He remarks that: 
 Allein er scharfsichtige Schweizer schrieb dieses in Frankreich und vermutlich 
 empfand er es als ein so groβer Vertheidiger des schönen Geschlechts, mit 
 Entrüstung, dass man  demselben nicht mit mehr wirklicher Achtung da selbst 
 begegnet (271). 
  
 Kant then moves to a description of the Germans, who are described perhaps not so 
surprisingly as the perfect mixture of the qualities of the beautiful and the sublime. “Er hat 
eine glückliche Mischung in dem Gefühle so wohl des Erhabenen und des Schönen“ (272). 
The Germans have the unique ability to sense both the beautiful and the sublime and seem to 
possess the most ideal combination of these qualities. He then moves on to the Dutch, who he 
again dismisses for their phlegmatic nature: “Er macht den Contrast so wohl gegen den 
Franzosen als den Engländer, und ist gewisser maβen ein sehr phlegmatisierter Deutsche[r]” 
(272). The Dutchman, who has little feeling for either the beautiful or the sublime and who 
possesses an inherent lack of motivation serves as the example for what can happen to a 
German if he does not cultivate his finer feelings. Again we see Kant privileging the capacity 
and motivation for moral growth as an ideal human quality. Apathy and lack of motivation 
are viewed as a very real threat to progress and the achievement of an ideal humanity based 
on moral principles. 
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 The remainder of the analysis is devoted to the people outside of Europe, and it is in 
this section of the treatise where Kant makes his boldest statements about the general lack of 
moral and rational capabilities in non-Europeans. He compares these other cultures with the 
European nations he just described, stating, “Wenn die Araber gleichsam die Spanier des 
Orients seien, so sind die Perser die Franzosen von Asien” (276). The Persians are viewed 
favorably because they are not such strict followers of Islam, and “erlauben ihrer zur 
Lustigkeit aufgelegten Gemütsart eine ziemlich milde Auslegung des Koran” (276). When 
making these broad comparisons with European nations, Kant always tends to highlight the 
degenerate qualities of these nations. Although the Japanese could technically be regarded as 
the “Engländer dieses Weltteils” (276), they show “wenig Merkmale eines feineren Gefühls 
an sich” (276).  
 In perhaps the most troubling passage of the entire essay, Kant employs a lengthy 
explanation of the inhabitants of Africa, who in his view have virtually no finer feeling and 
are incapable of moral improvement, citing the work of Hume as proof that no such 
capabilities exist within this culture: 
 Die Negers von Afrika haben von der Natur kein Gefühl welches über das   
 läppische stiege. Herr Hume fordert jedermann auf, ein einziges Beispiel   
 anzuführen, da ein Neger Talente gewiesen habe, und behauptet: Daβ unter  
 den hundertausenden von Schwarzen, die aus ihren Ländern anderwärts verführt  
 werden, obgleich deren sehr viele auch in Freiheit gefetzt werden, dennoch nicht  
 ein einziger jemals gefunden worden, der entweder in Kunst oder Wissenschaft,  
 oder irgend einer andern rühmlichen Eigenschaft etwas groβes vorgestellt 
 habe…(277) 
  
  
 Although he writes in the Bemerkungen zu den Beobachtungen that there can exist 
within “inferior” civilizations some individuals who possess moral feeling, the African is 
clearly exempt from this rule. In order to justify his own contradiction, Kant must make the 
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African into an entirely different class of human being. He states, “So wesentlich ist der 
Unterschied zwischen diesen zwei Menschengeschlechtern, und er scheint eben so groβ in 
Ansehung der Gemütsfähigkeiten, als der Farbe nach zu sein“ (277). According to Kant the 
African is hardly capable of any sort of moral action or achievement, and therefore he must 
be excluded from the human race. This fundamental and biological difference in skin color is 
for Kant an indication of a fundamental difference in mental character. This basic distinction 
is used to justify his exclusion of the African from his ideal community of rational and moral 
human beings.   
 As we have seen at various other junctures in this chapter, as well as in the chapter on 
gender, Kant is essentially redefining what constitutes humanity in order to exclude certain 
people from it. While in his chapter on human nature, Kant seems to acknowledge the 
problems with privileging the melancholic as the temperament most capable of achieving 
true moral virtue, in this final chapter he is decidedly less ambiguous and less indecisive 
about privileging the white male European as the ideal candidate for moral growth.  While 
the suggestion that some temperaments are better suited for virtuous acts than others seems 
for Kant to be somewhat difficult to reconcile, his notion of white European superiority 
seems to trouble him much less. By using physical, observable characteristics in the various 
nations examined in the text to make judgments about the inner moral capabilities of the 
people that inhabit them, Kant effectively creates a system in which the idea of “universality” 
is a concept that can only be truly applied to a select few. Consequently, by the time we reach 
the concluding remarks of the essay, the modern-day reader has become highly skeptical of 
Kant’s call to educate every young world citizen in order to elevate humanity’s moral 
feeling. When Kant calls for “das sittliche Gefühl frühzeitig in dem Busen eines jeden jungen 
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Weltbürgers zu einer thätigen Empfindung zu erhöhen” (280), it has by this point become 
quite clear that not every young citizen of the world can properly be included in this moral 
education he advocates.  Unlike Kant’s analysis of human temperament, which seems to 
embrace difference as an essential aspect of cosmopolitan universalism, Kant’s observations 
in this final chapter are based primarily on excluding that which is different. In order to 
justify this exclusion, Kant must completely re-conceptualize his idea of what constitutes the 
morally feeling human subject. 
  
 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Although the Beobachtungen über das Gefühl des Schönen und Erhabenen is often 
remembered more for its shortcomings than its strengths, this thesis has shown that taking a 
closer look at the text’s less agreeable moments can reveal greater insight about the true 
nature of its contradictions.  Central to Kant’s belief in the possibility of a humanity 
composed of diverse yet complementary elements is his theory of the temperaments. I have 
argued that it is in this section of the work where Kant most clearly acknowledges the 
problems with privileging the sublime over the beautiful.  The balancing of these diverse 
temperaments on a collective level creates a picture of humanity that encompasses people of 
all dispositions and embraces the various temperaments for their imperfections as well as 
their assets.  I argue that this balancing act is a way for Kant to avoid suggesting that the 
melancholic temperament is somehow superior to the other natural dispositions; each one 
needs the others in order for the “Gemälde von prächtigem Ausdruck” to function 
successfully. But as we move to the more unsettling chapters of the treatise on gender and 
national character, it becomes rather apparent that Kant’s stated belief in the “Gefühl von der 
Schönheit und der Würde der menschlichen Natur” is not as all-encompassing as it seems. 
While I have shown Kant to be conflicted at particular junctures in the essay with regards to 
the privileging of the melancholic temperament, his chapter on the character of the sexes 
reveals none of the same uncertainty. I have attempted to highlight how in its place we see 
Kant frequently reworking his own categories so as to exclude women from the privileged 
realm of sublime masculine understanding. This adjustment of his own theory to shut out 
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women is not, as has been previously suggested, merely an unfavorable and misogynist 
portrayal of women that should be dismissed as sexist, but is rather a critical attempt to 
reinforce and legitimize an emergent bourgeois gender order that gained prominence during 
this time would gain even more legitimacy in the nineteenth century. By arguing that male 
and female complement each other and that each sex has definitive societal roles, 
philosophers such as Kant, Herder, Rousseau and Fichte laid the groundwork for a new 
perception of gender roles which rationalized the confinement of women within the private 
sphere. While certainly sexist from a contemporary perspective, I suggest that it is also 
indicative of a struggle to define the acceptable place of women within the ideal picture of a 
morally whole community advocated in the chapter on temperament. This struggle to find an 
acceptable space for women is in many ways characteristic of much of Enlightenment 
thought, and in the clearly defined gender roles that are repeatedly justified and defended in 
this essay Kant is revealed, like many of his contemporaries, as a thinker who is deeply 
concerned with the inherent contradictions of excluding women from the realm of the 
morally virtuous sublime. I have also illustrated how a similar struggle is at play in perhaps 
the most troubling chapter of the Beobachtungen, the section on national character. This 
chapter of the text is perhaps the most at odds with Kant’s insistence in the third chapter that 
all humans are endowed with worth and dignity. As I have shown, in this chapter Kant is 
concerned with defining the potential for moral progress and growth as one of the most basic 
traits of the human subject.  This definition allows him to completely exclude certain groups 
from this realm and project the white male European as the ideal human being who is most 
capable of attaining his true moral potential. The universality of feeling that Kant describes at 
earlier points in the text is here redefined as something that can only truly exist for a 
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privileged few. Although these statements are undoubtedly highly prejudicial and racist by 
today’s standards, they merit our attention for the problematic way in which they attempt to 
redefine the basic characteristics of what it means to be human. Kant is here not only 
redefining humanity, he is essentially creating two separate “Menschengeschlechte,” using 
reason itself to justify the prevention of non-Europeans from receiving full status as rational 
and moral human beings. If all people are indeed endowed with the capacity to be moral and 
rational, as Kant seems to suggest in his chapter on human temperament, then it would 
therefore be theoretically permissible for people from all gender and racial backgrounds to 
enjoy privileged positions within his proposed ideal community of rational-moral human 
beings. I claim that while Kant’s theory of the temperaments outlined in this essay lies at the 
heart of his thinking on the necessity of diversity, the final two chapters on gender and 
national character can be read as attempts to modify his theory so as to promote a clear 
hierarchy which privileges some and subordinates others.  I argue that while Kant is actively 
reflecting on the problem of privileging the sublime over the beautiful in his chapter on 
temperament, the subsequent chapters of the essay engage with this problem in a different 
way. These troublesome remarks on gender and race are not, as others have suggested, 
completely disjointed from and contradictory to Kant’s idea of a universal humanity outlined 
in the chapter on temperament.  I argue that Kant’s writings on gender and national character 
in the Beobachtungen are also engaged in an active struggle to resolve the problem of 
privileging certain groups over others. This problem is central to Kant’s conception of 
universality and is in many ways impossible to solve.  The extreme lengths that Kant goes to 
portray the white male European as the best-suited propagator of Enlightenment ideals 
appears to stand in stark contrast to his alleged belief in the inherent worth and dignity of all 
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human beings that he advocates in his discussion of temperament. But the work as a whole 
reflects an awareness of the difficulty of reconciling the universal moral qualities of 
humanity with the diverse human elements that comprise it. The problem of privilege and 
Kant’s attempts to resolve it reveal an underlying uneasiness about the role of women and 
non-Europeans within his own proposed ideal community of rational and moral human 
beings.  
 The apparent contradictions in this work are in many ways reflective of a broader 
Enlightenment discourse which engaged heavily with themes of diversity, tolerance, gender, 
education, race and national identity. Kant is by no means the only thinker of this era who 
grappled with questions of diversity and tolerance, or who exhibited a strong belief in the 
progression of humanity and the ability of the individual and the community to continually 
strive for greater perfection. The question of how humanity could improve itself, how these 
emerging social roles should ideally function, and how the goals of freedom, tolerance, 
education and autonomy could eventually be realized were taken up by many great writers of 
the Enlightenment, providing a rich field for further inquiry.  The development of the 
bürgerliches Trauerspiel during this era sought to portray this search for bourgeois 
subjectivity and its defined gender roles on the stage, and many of the themes put forth in the 
Beobachtungen resurface in this genre. Kant’s ideas about gender, class and difference also 
reappear in the epistolary novels of the period, which served as ideal popularizing vehicles 
for moral education and were concerned with a similar project of defining key roles for the 
diverse individuals in society. Other great dramatic works of the period, such as Lessing’s 
Nathan der Weise, engage with Kant’s conceptions of universal human freedom in their 
explorations of difference and tolerance in religion and national character. This play proposes 
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an ideal utopian community that claims to extend its arms to people of all religions and 
nationalities, even as it also excludes women and expects its non-European and non-Christian 
members to assimilate and adapt to Western cultural and societal norms. The writers of this 
period were very much concerned with resolving the problem of privilege that Kant struggles 
with in the Beobachtungen, and by examining their progressive ideas for the improvement of 
humanity (flawed as many of them might be) we can come closer to an understanding of why 
diversity and difference presented such a critical problem to these thinkers, both in the 
eighteenth century and beyond.
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